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Underdevelopment and Violence in Latin America

William Platon Mandros
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

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Author

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Donald J. Baxter

Donald J. Baxter

Chonghan Kim

George Grayson

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to illustrate the components of the theory of underdevelopment and violence as outlined by the Alliance for Progress and the 1984 National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America.

Based on an assessment of its accuracy and validity and the success of its application during the Alliance for Progress, does the theory of underdevelopment and violence represent a viable foundation for United States foreign policy?

The results of this study suggest that the theory of underdevelopment and violence in its present form, does not represent a viable foundation for United States foreign policy in underdeveloped countries of the world. The theory consists of an unproven set of assumptions that do not establish a solid foundation for foreign policy. In addition, the application of the theory during the Alliance demonstrated numerous problems. First, the theory is based on U.S. middle class values and desires. Its success is dependent upon the acceptance of these values in societies where middle class values are not the same. Second, business interests affect foreign policy and they do not necessarily coincide with economic, political, and social development policies. And third, during the Alliance, the theory of underdevelopment and violence was conceived and implemented without the participation of many traditional foreign policy actors. Once those traditional players were called upon to implement the Alliance, they were able to transform the program to suit their interests and concerns. Due to the nature of the U.S. foreign policy process, it is likely that the theory of underdevelopment and violence would be subjected to the same pressures if it were to be set in motion again.

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

INTRODUCTION

Throughout much of the world, United States security interests are bound to the well-being of friendly countries. Many of these countries are economically, politically, and militarily strong and secure. Thus, U.S. interests for the most part seem relatively safe. However, in other parts of the world, U.S. interests appear threatened by the economic, political, and social crises present in friendly developing countries. For example, in the Philippines, where U.S. military forces at Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base help to maintain a deterrent to the growing Soviet military presence in the Pacific, the fledgling government of Corazon Aquino faces a persistent communist insurgency from the New People's Army (NPA), a stagnating economy, and dissident elements of the old Marcos regime, all of which seem to threaten the U.S. facilities. In Central America, the challenge to U.S. interests are present as well. The devaluation of the Mexican peso and falling world market prices for petroleum have helped spawn resentment and dissatisfaction with Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI). In Guatemala and El Salvador, stagnating economies and dismal social and political

conditions are accompanied by various intensities of insurgent warfare. The persistent question that foreign policy makers face is how can the United States safeguard its interests in developing countries which are experiencing such problems?

Although the U.S. has striven to protect its interests through the use of military force, economic assistance, sanctions, and embargoes, support of friendly political groups, and the marshalling of international condemnation or support, it is the policy of lending U.S. assistance, specifically to improve a developing county's economic, political, and social plight, that forms the topic of this discussion.

Academic writings and debates of the late 1950s spawned a theory which serves as the nucleus for the construction and implementation of United States foreign policy in underdeveloped nations of the world. This theory assumes that economic, political, and social underdevelopment cause instability, violence, a potential for communist revolution, and thus a threat to U.S. security interests. Therefore, this theory reasons, United States interests can be defended successfully by overcoming the conditions of underdevelopment through the extension of economic, political, and social assistance.

This guide for foreign policy was the centerpiece of a U.S. sponsored hemisphere-wide initiative called the

Alliance for Progress and recently endorsed by the 1984 National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America. This thesis asks, based on an assessment of its accuracy and validity and the success of its application during the Alliance for Progress, whether this theory of underdevelopment and violence represents a viable foundation for United States foreign policy.

In order to answer this question the components of the theory of underdevelopment and violence must be explored. Chapter one of this thesis will examine the Alliance for Progress and the 1984 National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America to uncover the concepts of the theory of underdevelopment and violence. Chapter two will seek to establish the validity and accuracy of the theory and chapter three will attempt to assess, with the aid of three different perspectives, the success of its application during the Alliance for Progress. As a result of this examination, a judgement can be made in the fourth and concluding chapter regarding the theory's viability as a basis for United States foreign policy in underdeveloped nations.

CHAPTER I

In 1961, President Kennedy announced the commencement of a multi-million dollar program to assist Latin America countries and christened it the Alliance for Progress. Kennedy characterized its scope as similar to that which was needed to rebuild the economies of Western Europe after World War II."[1] More than twenty years after this declaration, in 1984, the National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America--popularly referred to as the Kissinger Commission--released its findings and recommendations. What these two seemingly unrelated events have in common is the articulation of a theory which serves as a method for understanding the relationship of conditions and events in underdeveloped countries--Latin America specifically--and as a focal point for the conception and implementation of United States foreign policy. This theory proposes that economic, political, and social underdevelopment cause violence, instability, and communist encroachment.

This chapter examines the Alliance for Progress and the National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America, not only to illustrate their similarities, but also to

illuminate the components and concepts of the theory of underdevelopment and violence. The theory is based on four assumptions which are specified in official documents and statements from the period of the Alliance for Progress and in the findings and recommendations of the 1984 National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America. Examining the foreign policy record during the Alliance and the findings and recommendations of the Commission will illuminate the similarities between the Alliance and the Commission, as well as the components of the theory of underdevelopment and violence.

The first assumption indicates that economic, political, and social underdevelopment lead to violence and instability. It was believed that frustration over these conditions caused people to react violently. The second assumption illustrates that violence and instability cause the root conditions, economic, political, and social underdevelopment, to worsen. This interrelationship can be characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment leads to violence and instability which in turn foster increased underdevelopment. The third assumption theorizes that the degenerating cycle of underdevelopment, violence, and instability encourage communist subversion and revolution. Finally, the fourth assumption argues that violence, instability, and communist encroachment can be stopped by bringing about economic, political, and social

development. However, because these three areas of underdevelopment appear interdependent, it is reasoned that improvements in one or two areas of underdevelopment will not necessarily halt violence, instability, or communist intrusion. As a result, the theory, as evidenced by the programs of the Alliance and recommendations of the Commission, places equal reliance on economic, political, and social development programs to overcome violence, instability, and communist encroachment.

Before examining the assumptions underlying the theory of underdevelopment and violence, it is necessary to define economic, political, and social underdevelopment. The search for the meaning of these terms exposes the use of a combination of examples to form definitions for economic, political, and social underdevelopment. In effect, the Commission Report and policymakers during the Alliance attached several, yet similar, meanings to each area of underdevelopment. For example, economic underdevelopment, often regarded as economic recession, was also interpreted to include high unemployment, decreasing or low gross national product (GNP), a high trade deficit, or a straining national debt. Political underdevelopment was defined as inadequate governmental services, but also the absence of democratic institutions and processes. From the viewpoint of Alliance policymakers and Commission members, political underdevelopment constituted lack of free elections,

effective public forums and processes by which citizens can express opinions freely and influence public policy. Finally, the definition of social underdevelopment includes inequitable income, tax, and land distribution, poverty, malnutrition, and inequitable access to education, housing, water, and medical facilities. Like economic and political underdevelopment, social underdevelopment was characterized in a number of ways.

In order to comprehend the theory of underdevelopment and violence it is necessary to understand how policymakers during the Alliance and the Commission members viewed the conditions in Latin America. Both were certain that Latin America exhibited symptoms of underdevelopment--poverty, frustrated expectations, social and political injustice, and economic recession to name a few. Compounding these maladies were uncontrolled population growth and urbanization which, according to the Commission Report, "magnified the problems of inequitable distribution of national income and overwhelmed the limited resources that governments were prepared to devote to social services."[2] Borrowing statistics provided by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), the Commission report estimated that of the 23 million inhabitants of Central America, 14 million could be classified poor and from that number one-third lacked a nutritionally adequate diet.[3]

In 1961, the year in which the Alliance for Progress

was launched, President Kennedy's delegates to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, recognized Latin America's economic, political, and social underdevelopment. Their findings detailed deficiencies in housing, water, and medical facilities, substandard working conditions and low wages, the need for agrarian and tax reform, increased literacy, improvement of the balance of trade, the stimulation of private investment and enterprise, and the lack of democratic institutions and processes.[4] According to the Commission and policymakers during the Alliance, these conditions provided the impetus for violence and instability.

The first assumption of the theory of underdevelopment and violence indicates that economic, political, and social underdevelopment produce violence and instability. The Commission found that those nations in Latin America who responded to this threat with increased economic, political, and social development "have been marked by a stability astonishing in light of the misery which still afflicts the hemisphere."[5] Nevertheless, in sounding a warning to those nations failing to come to grips with underdevelopment, Commission member Edward Marasciulo of the Pan American Development Foundation, indicated that they would continue to face violence and political instability.[6] In more menacing terms, the Commission compared the human need of

Latin Americans to "tinder waiting to be ignited" into a conflagration that could threaten the entire hemisphere.[7]

Utilizing the same assumption during the Alliance, policymakers were convinced that if Latin American governments were to be spared revolution, economic, political, and social progress commensurate to the aspirations of their people must be undertaken.[8] According to Wymberly Coerr, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in 1961, unless hope could be given to the masses of Latin America, mounting frustration and unrest caused by economic, political, and social underdevelopment would lead to further violence and destruction. Based on an analysis of the type of violence and instability plaguing Latin America, Coerr insisted that continued economic, political, and social underdevelopment would cause many Latin Americans to seek relief through radical transformation of their economic, political, and social structures.[9] Equally vehement about the prospects for escalating violence was Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann, who warned that "support of the status quo will only invite more violent and destructive change."[10]

One example of the problems caused by underdevelopment was the issue of land reform in Latin America. During the Alliance, the land distribution problem in Latin America provided policymakers with clear evidence that social underdevelopment--specifically the need for land

reform--was a major contributor to the atmosphere of violence and instability. In the predominantly agricultural countries of Latin America, ownership of land reflects personal wealth as well as political and social status. As a result, Latin American countries were commonly characterized by a few of the nation's elite owning most of the arable land while the majority of the poor scratched out an existence on meager plots. Lester D. Mallory, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, addressed this dilemma of the landless masses when he stated:

> Picture the social and political effects, the political dynamite, of having hundreds of thousands of tiny exhausted [land] holdings side by side with tremendous estates that, as often as not, are under-cultivated and managed for absentee landlords.[11]

The Commission report and policymakers during the Alliance theorized that economic, political, and social underdevelopment caused violence and instability. The second assumption of the theory of underdevelopment and violence demonstrates that violence and instability cause the root conditions, economic, political, and social underdevelopment, to worsen. This interrelationship can be characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment leads to violence and instability which, in turn, fosters increased underdevelopment.

Experience with the Alliance illustrated that a leading deterrent to the success of any assistance program would be the instability and violence that assistance programs were

initially conceived to battle. Undoubtedly, equitable distribution of land, construction of schools, or improved medical care, all equally important policy goals in the fight for social development, could not take place in the midst of a revolution, and unquestionably, that is exactly where the development programs were needed the most. Both the Alliance policymakers and members of the Commission realized that a cyclical process takes place where instability and violence, initially provoked by underdevelopment, would continue to perpetuate the status quo and thwart development. This phenomenon is identified by policymakers during the Alliance and by members of the Commission--especially in the case of private U.S. investments.

The Alliance for Progress and the Commission report relied on private investment as a key to alleviating a myriad of development problems. In fact, investment and loans from private businesses and lending institutions represented a sizable portion of development assistance during the Alliance and for the programs envisioned by the Commission. During the Alliance, David E. Bell, Administrator for the Agency for International Development, asserted that applying private investment could lead to the "amelioration of the region's most basic problems."[12] However, like other aspects of development aid, violence and instability tended to drive away private investors before

they were able to extend assistance.

Experience during the Alliance's first year taught Peter R Nehemkis, Washington Counsel for the Whirlpool Corporation, that the threat of revolution in Latin America had disheartened even the most speculative investor. As early as 1962, Nehemkis concluded that the political environment in Latin America proved inhospitable for private U.S. investors.[13]

Reporting similar experiences, the Commission estimated that before 1984, regional tension and political unrest had resulted in a 3 billion dollar capital flight from Central America.[14] In the face of this deteriorating investment climate, the Commission's primary objective prior to instituting development plans required cessation to violence and civil strife. According to the Commission, "no need is more basic for the success of economic, political, and social progress, than the elimination of the fear of brutality inflicted by arbitrary authority and terrorism, and the establishment peace."[15]

The Commission report and the policymakers during the Alliance recognized that the impediments to private investment resulted from the cyclical nature of underdevelopment and violence, which hindered providing assistance. However, the conditions in Latin America which contributed to the escalation of violence and made the commitment of assistance more difficult served as a catalyst

for communist subversion and revolution.

The third assumption of the theory of underdevelopment and violence illustrates that the degenerating cycle of underdevelopment, violence, and instability encourages communist subversion and revolution. The theory proposes the stimulus for the spread of communism in Latin America is underdevelopment. It was believed by policymakers during the Alliance and by members of the Commission that to blame ferment and distress in Latin America merely on communism was incorrect. Communism is a result, not a cause, it acts to "exploit weakness in the political, economic, and social fabric of Central America."[16] And, as a result of this frailty, according to Commission member Carl Gershman, Central America presents an inviting target for communist insurgency.[17]

Similarly, in 1963, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, R. R. Rubottum, suspected that dissatisfaction with existing conditions and a yearning for change bred frictions and frustrations which served only to make Latin American societies more susceptible to communist influences.[18] Confirming this view before a 1963 Congressional Committee on communist subversion in Latin America, Lt. General Joseph F. Carol, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, pointed out that social inequalities and economic stagnation proved ideal conditions in which communist subversion could flourish.[19]

What appeared to enhance the Marxist revolutionaries' appeal to many Latin Americans, according to the Commission report, was the belief that communists represented society's only vehicle for economic, political, and social reform.[20]

During the Alliance, this conviction was equally popular. Lester Mallory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs during the Alliance, found that land inequality in the rural territories of Latin America provided the communists with a powerful political tool. By proposing expropriation and redistribution of land, the communists were able to transform these areas into bastions of popular support.[21] While in the urban areas, by speaking out against social inequalities, communists attempt to seduce the population into viewing them as the true champions of democracy.[22] But perhaps even more threatening than the communists' appeal to the disillusioned is their political and military affiliation with communist countries.

Policymakers during the Alliance considered the Soviet Union the primary sponsor of communist revolutionaries in Latin America. Relying on proxies such as Cuba, the Soviets provided arms, indoctrination, training, and support to those who were willing to foment revolution.[23] Not only was Cuba judged to be the platform from which a communist infiltration and attack would be launched, but also as the central location from which the final drive to bring Latin

America into the communist world would occur.[24]

Similarly, the Commission identified Cuba as the center for supervision and control of training camps and indoctrination schools, where trainees would receive up to six months of instruction in guerrilla warfare, strategy, weapons, propaganda, and agitation.[25] As a result, the Commission characterized Cuba as "the country best prepared and most eager to exploit the intensifying crisis in Central America."[26]

With the fall of Nicaragua's dictator, Anastasio Somoza in 1979, and the Sandinista takeover and subsequent alignment with the Soviet Union, Nicaragua had become, in the eyes of the Commission, the primary threat to Central America. Characterized as a "mainland platform" for communist subversion, Nicaragua was considered a "crucial steppingstone for Cuban and Soviet efforts to promote armed struggle in Central America."[27] According to Commission member, Ambassador William H Luers:

> The potential for the consolidation of a Sandinista Marxist-Leninist government, allied with the Soviet Union and Cuba and committed to the export of revolution across its land boarder, contribute significantly to the region's disorder."[28]

A huge military buildup, coupled with an apparent intention to use it to promote revolution in neighboring countries, indicated to the Commission that Nicaragua's commitment to the cause of armed struggle in the region would not diminish.[29]

Motivated by this threat to hemispheric security, both the Commission and policymakers during the Alliance for Progress foresaw an assistance plan designed to attack the foundations of instability, violence, and communist encroachment. The fourth assumption of the theory of underdevelopment and violence indicates that violence, instability, and communist encroachment can be stopped by bringing about economic, political, and social development. However, because economic, political, and social underdevelopment appear interdependent, it is reasoned that improvements in one or two areas of underdevelopment will not necessarily halt violence, instability, or communist intrusion. As a result, the theory, as evidenced by the programs of the Alliance and recommendations of the Commission, places equal reliance on economic, political, and social development programs to overcome violence, instability, and communist encroachment.

The Commission's findings and recommendations and the development programs initiated by the Alliance for Progress can be characterized as a blueprint for the long-term restructuring of Latin American societies based on the theory of underdevelopment and violence. William C. Doherty, Commission member and representative of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, echoed the Commission's hope for applying United States resources to promote economic development and advance democratic and

social reforms when he said:

> The required political, economic, and social changes imply a long-term commitment from the United States. What is being suggested here is nothing short of a peaceful long-term democratic revolution--the changing of political systems and overcoming social injustice that have plagued the masses of Central America for centuries.[30]

Similarly, the necessity of guiding the evolution of Latin American societies was met with the same enthusiasm during the Alliance. Reflecting these views during Congressional hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann, reiterated that the Alliance for Progress

> . . . serves the security interests of the United States by supplementing the efforts of American Republics to build viable, expanding economies that are better able: To provide the jobs, food, education, and other necessities required for their fast growing populations; To promote the growth of democratic institutions; To support the desires of their peoples for political and economic freedom; . . .[31]

To combat the spread of violence, instability, and communism, the theory of underdevelopment and violence proposes attacking the very foundation upon which these problems take root. Once economic, political, and social development takes hold, frustration and violence, which germinate the seeds of communist subversion, are eliminated. However, arguing that the crisis of underdevelopment cannot be considered in just economic or political terms, the Commission pointed out that without improvement in all three areas of underdevelopment a viable long-term process of

development cannot take place. Accordingly:

> The requirements for the development of Central America are a seamless web. The actions we recommend represent an effort to address this complex interrelationship in its totality not just its parts.[32]

To illustrate its point, the Commission noted that in spite of impressive economic advances in Latin America during a period in which economic issues and programs were emphasized, "the fruits of [this] expansion were distributed in a flagrantly inequitable manner."[33] For example, Central America experienced an average annual increase in GNP of 2.5 percent during the late 1960s, nevertheless, the residual political and social underdevelopment continued to foster an atmosphere of violence and instability. Consequently, the Commission concluded that "unless economic recovery is accompanied by social and political reform, additional financial support will ultimately be wasted."[34]

Kennedy administration officials also recognized the interdependence of economic, political, and social underdevelopment. Assailing just social or economic problems seemed wasteful when achievements such as an increase in GNP could not restrain continuing frustration and violence sparked by stagnant or worsening political and social conditions. This interdependence of conditions appeared in the maldistribution of land in Latin America. According to the Congressional testimony of Raymond J. Penn, professor at the University of Wisconsin:

> Land ownership in Latin America is more than just the control and ownership of the land resource. It is the web on which the existing economic, social, and political structure rests.[35]

Land ownership equates to status in one's community, freedom to act and speak freely, an opportunity to education, and ultimately the right to share in the control of the government. Therefore, it seemed obvious that attacking just economic, political, or social conditions alone would not solve the current dilemma. According to President Kennedy, in order for the Alliance to succeed, political freedom must accompany material and social progress.[36] The success of applying the theory of underdevelopment and violence to the crisis in Latin America rested upon the precept that "social and political progress is not a substitute for economic progress but an essential condition of it."[37]

The programs envisioned by the Commission report not only parallel those of the Alliance for Progress, but also serve as evidence for the assumption that violence, instability, and communist aggression can be combatted with development programs. A review of these recommendations will help to illustrate this assumption.

The short-term plans recommended by the Commission concentrate on: First, adopting and promoting a Central American Common Market; Second, increasing U.S. bilateral economic assistance ($400 million) to create jobs and

support balance of trade deficits; Third, aid for labor intensive projects such as housing; Fourth, trade credit guarantees; Fifth, refinancing trade deficits; And sixth, supporting a Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). As long-term development policies, the Commission proposed instituting a $24 billion dollar aid package made up of public and private sector grants, loans, and investments, creation of a Central America Development Organization (CADO) whose Central American staff would review and recommend aid plans, and support of the Caribbean Basin Initiative which would establish duty-free entry for Central American goods into the U.S. and between Central American nations. In the realm of political development, the Commission envisioned grants, loans, and investments for democratic institutions and leadership training. Financial assistance would be used to encourage grass-root political participation through neighborhood groups and regional cooperatives. Finally, social development schemes proposed by the Commission included food aid, expanded literacy programs through the Peace Corps, 10,000 scholarships to U.S. colleges, family planning programs, and technical assistance for health care, disease control, and housing projects. According to the theory of underdevelopment and violence, the introduction and success of these programs will lead to economic, political, and social improvements which will cause a reduction in violence, instability, and

communist encroachment.

In conclusion, the theory of underdevelopment and violence can be summarized as four assumptions outlined in the official documents and statements of the period during the Alliance for Progress and by the findings and recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America. The first assumption indicates that economic, political, and social underdevelopment lead to violence and instability. It was believed that frustration over these conditions caused people to react violently. The second assumption illustrates that violence and instability cause the root conditions, economic, political, and social underdevelopment, to worsen. This interrelationship can be characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment leads to violence and instability which in turn foster increased underdevelopment. The third assumption theorizes that the degenerating cycle of underdevelopment, violence, and instability encourage communist subversion and revolution. Finally, the fourth assumption argues that violence, instability, and communist encroachment can be stopped by bringing about economic, political, and social development. However, because these three areas of underdevelopment appear to be closely interdependent, it is reasoned that improvements in one or two areas of underdevelopment will not necessarily halt violence, instability, or communist intrusion. As a result, the

theory, as evidenced by the programs of the Alliance and the recommendations of the Commission, places equal reliance on economic, political, and social development programs to overcome violence, instability, and communist encroachment.

The enormity of the project proposed by the Commission and undertaken during the Alliance presents numerous opportunities to discuss the practical application of each measure. However, the immediate question concerns the validity and accuracy of the theory of underdevelopment and violence. Does this theory represent a realistic view of the causes of instability and violence? With this question in mind, the following chapter will examine a body of literature known as cross-national causal analysis. As a result of this review, we may be equipped to judge the theoretical value of the theory of underdevelopment and violence better.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

[1]New York Times, 6 August 1961, p.1.

[2]U.S., President, Commission Report, "Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America," January 1984, p. 24. (Hereafter cited as "Commission Report.")

[3]Ibid., p.42. Also see, U.S., President, Commission Report, "Appendix to the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America," March 1984, p. 141. (Hereafter cited as "Appendix to the Report.")

[4]U.S., Department of State, Alianza Para El Progreso, The Record of Punta del Este from the Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, (5-17 August 1961), p. 1.

[5]Commission Report, p. 11.

[6]Appendix to the Report, p. 139.

[7]Commission Report, p. 37.

[8]U.S., Department of State, Social Implications of the Act of Bogota, Department of State Pubn. No. 7120 (1960), p. 2. Statement of Lester D. Mallory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

[9]U.S., Department of State, Forces of Change in Latin America, Department of State Pubn. No. 7157 (20 February 1961), p.4. Coerr's typology of revolutions in Latin America identified "palace revolutions"--usually a redistribution of power among factions of the military and the country's elites--as those least likely to result in violence and social change. However, recent developments indicated the emergence of "social revolutions" associated with the frustrations of middle and lower classes and more often resulting in extreme violence and radical change. Ibid., p. 4.

[10]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 H.R. 15253. 88th Cong., 2nd

sess., 1964, p. 268.

[11]U.S., Department of State, The Land Problem in the Americas, Department of State Pubn. No. 7112 (1960), p. 10.

[12]U.S., Congress, House, Joint Economic Committee, Private Investment in Latin America, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on inter-American Relations of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964, p. 456-457.

[13]U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic Developments in South America, Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relations of the Joint Economic Committee. 87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, p. 51.

[14]Commission Report, p. 51. Other inhibitors to increased U.S. private investment in Central America included the threat of expropriation without compensation or fair access to foreign country's court system. Because of this limited access, U.S. investors found it difficult to secure insurance. In addition, policies that many host countries adopted helped to dissuade U.S. investors. For example, the Clavo Doctrine which was the result of 19th century Argentine Jurists, states that foreign investors must subject themselves exclusively to the laws and courts of the host country. Another problem revolved around "Decision 24," which called for foreign investors to allow at least 51% of their subsidiaries stock to be held by local entities. U.S., Department of State, The Role of Investment in Latin America's Economic Future, Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, (November 19, 1984), pp. 1-20.

[15]Commission Report, p. 51.

[16] Appendix to the Report, p. 194. Statement by Commission and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff member, Dr. Margaret Daley Hayes.

[17]Appendix to the Report, p. 323.

[18]U.S., Department of State, International Communism in Latin America, Department of State Pubn. No. 1243 (1960), p. 5.

[19]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 14532. 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 153.

[20]Commission Report, p. 88.

[21]U.S., Department of State, The Land Problem in the Americas, p. 12.

[22]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, p. 5. Statement by Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

[23]U.S., Department of State, Forces of Change in Latin America, p. 21. An outspoken proponent of this charge was CIA Director John A. McCone, who stated that Cuban's main thrust is in the supply of inspiration, guidance, training, equipment, and the technical assistance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, p. 63.

[24]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Communist Threat in Latin America, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 1960, p. 6. Statement by Representative Daniel Flood. Additional evidence of Cuban involvement included exhibits, presented by Jules Dubois, Latin American corespondent for the Chicago Tribune, such as instructions on guerrilla warfare, pamphlets on how to make dynamite and Molotov cocktails, questionnaires given to new recruits on their way to Havana, and finally, intercepts of confidential instructions to the Cuban Charge d' Affairs in Buenos Aires to organize and activate guerrilla commands throughout the country. U.S., Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, Documentation of Communist Penetration in Latin America, Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, Exhibit No.7. pp. 35-36.

[25]Appendix to the Report, p. 336.

[26]Commission Report, p. 86.

[27]Ibid., p. 91.

[28]Appendix to the Report, p. 234.

[29]Ibid., p. 322. Also see Commission Report, p. 27.

[30]Appendix to the Report, p. 117.

[31]U.S., Congress, House, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 H.R. 15253. p. 267.

[32]Commission Report, p. 41.

[33]Ibid., p. 60.

[34]Ibid., p. 52.

[35]U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic Developments in South America, Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relations of the Joint Economic Committee. p. 13.

[36]U.S., President, Address, "Alianza Para el Progreso," 13 March 1961, p.11.

[37]New York Times, 15 March 1961, p. 12. Statement by President Kennedy.

CHAPTER II

The theory of underdevelopment and violence proposes that economic, political, and social underdevelopment cause violence, instability, and communist penetration. However, can it be stated with certainty that economic, political, and social underdevelopment cause violence, instability, and communist encroachment? Are all three conditions of underdevelopment equally important or does economic underdevelopment alone spark violence and instability? Finally, do the relationships proposed by the theory of underdevelopment and violence provide the foundation for clearly defined policies with specific objectives? With these questions in mind, this chapter will survey a body of literature dealing with cross-national causal analysis and seek to establish the validity and accuracy of the theory of underdevelopment and violence.

Three articles on cross-national causal analysis, the first by William H. Flannigan and Edwin Fogelman, the second by Peter and Anne Schneider, and the third by Ted Gurr, form the basis of this investigation. By quantifying and qualifying the indicators of underdevelopment these authors have attempted to establish statistical relationships

between various aspects of economic, political, and social underdevelopment and violence.

The first study, "Patterns of Political Violence In Comparative Historical Perspective," by William Flannigan and Edwin Fogelman, examines the proposition that domestic political violence is the result of a country's economic and democratic underdevelopment. In other words, political violence is more likely to occur in countries characterized by low levels of economic and democratic development and countries with developed economies and sturdy democratic institutions are likely to be relatively violence free. It is essential to point out that these studies are not concerned with criminal violence such as robbery or murder, but with political violence directed at political institutions and policies. The domestic political violence index used by Flannigan and Fogelman is characteristic of this genre of comparative study. The authors' index includes political assassinations, riots, coups d' etats, rebellions, and civil wars.

The first proposition to be tested states that violence is directly linked to a country's level of economic development. As economic development increases over time, political violence will decrease in frequency and magnitude. Conversely, as economic underdevelopment increases over time, political violence will increase in frequency and magnitude. The level of economic development (the dependent

variable) of each country is categorized in one of four patterns.

Pattern One

> Continuous low level of development. More than 60 percent of the work force engaged in agriculture.

Pattern Two

> More than 60 percent of the work force engaged in agriculture by 1900 and more than 35 percent of the work force engaged in agriculture by 1960.

Pattern Three

> Less than 60 percent of the work force engaged in agriculture by 1900 and less than 35 percent of the work force engaged in agriculture by 1960.

Pattern Four

> Less than 60 percent of the work force engaged in agriculture by 1860 and less than 25 percent of the work force engaged in agriculture by 1960.[1]

Based on the statistical relationships that emerged, the authors asserted that "the most violent countries tend to be those at the lowest levels of economic development, with a decreasing incidence of domestic violence as we move from pattern one, two, three, and four."[2] In fact, such a "direct and consistent" association exists between the incidence of political violence and patterns of economic development, the authors claim:

> The incidence of domestic political violence during the 20th century in countries which have begun their economic development in this century is not unlike the incidence of violence in countries which are now highly developed but

> were themselves in the process of development in the 19th century.[3]

In order to test their second proposition, which focuses on democracy and violence, the authors constructed an eight point index of democracy based on forms of selection of chief executive, political competition, extent of suffrage, and degree of political suppression. Stated simply, the authors propose that violence is more likely to occur in countries ranked low on democracy and less likely in those ranked high. Although their conclusions indicated that democratic countries experienced relatively low levels of political violence, these low levels were more closely associated with steady economic growth.[4] Therefore, because economic development exhibited a stronger statistical relationship to violence the authors conclude that "the critical factor in explaining the relative absence or abundance of violence is the pattern of economic development rather than the type of regime."[5]

In another examination of internal political violence, Peter and Anne Schneider, in their work, "Political Institutions and Comparative Violence," compare violence to social mobilization, economic development, and the strength of political institutions. Unlike Flannigan and Fogelman, the Schneiders argue that economic development alone has no direct impact upon the maintenance of political order. "Rather, according to the data presented, political violence is most likely to occur when the development of strong

political institutions lags behind the process of social mobilization."[6]

Social mobilization is the process in which old social, economic, and psychological commitments are replaced be new patterns of socialization and behavior. Mobilization is assumed to increase the overall quantity of political demands. A transformation from a rural to a predominantly urban society and from an agricultural to an industrial society characterize the Schneiders' definition of mobilization as well as another author's definition of modernization. For example, Karl W. Deutsch believed mobilization occurred during modernization, i.e., where advanced non-traditional practices in culture, technology, and economic life are introduced and accepted on a considerable scale.[7] According to the Schneiders, improved economic conditions and strong political institutions primarily ease tensions among people by satisfying new demands created by mobilization. Drawing on the work of Samuel P. Huntington, the Schneiders measure the strength of political institutions (institutionalization) based on adaptability (age of the nation's constitution and major political parties), complexity (expenditure of the central and local governments social welfare services), coherence (percentage of the cabinet positions held by the majority party and the total number of different parties represented in the cabinet), and legitimacy (a value judgement based on

the number of parties opposed to the structure of the political system).[8] Therefore, the Schneiders argue that during economic hard times, social disorder and violence usually result from the inability of the political system to meet the new demands created by mobilization.[9]

Unlike Flannigan and Fogelman, the Schneiders regard economic development, as well as institutionalization, as an intervening variable which interacts with the mobilization process. Taken individually, social mobilization, economic development, and institutionalization do not reveal an important relationship to violence. However, the results show that when countries experience low levels of economic development in tandem with a high rate of social mobilization, which in turn exceeds the ability of the regime's political institutions to cope with the increased demands, violence usually follows.[10]

A third study, by Ted Gurr, entitled, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," examines relative deprivation as a cause of political violence. According to Gurr:

> Relative deprivation is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one form or another.[11]

Deprivation is the discrepancy between value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled), and value

capabilities (the amount of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get). The determinants of deprivation include sharp increases in peoples' expectations resulting from short-term trends in inflation and domestic production and persisting inequalities marked by economic and political discrimination, political separatism, dependence on foreign capital, religious cleavages, and finally, lack of educational opportunity.[12] What Gurr's results indicate is that strife varies directly in magnitude and intensity to relative deprivation.[13]

The common theme among the three studies is that violence results from dissatisfaction (economic, political, social, or a combination) among people. The difference among the authors is how to measure this dissatisfaction and which component of dissatisfaction is most conducive to violence. These three works represent only a few of the efforts to uncover a causal relationship between violence and various societal conditions. In his book, Mass Political Violence, Douglas A. Hibbs notes that the predominant view concerning the causes of violence is:

> The process of rapid urbanization in general makes for social instability, and that recent migrants caught up in this process are especially likely to engage in political violence.[14]

A sampling of other works illustrates a number of similar opinions. William Kornhauser, in his book, The Politics of Mass Society, found that the social disruption

that accompanies rapid urbanization and industrialization "is destabilizing because it uproots and atomizes large numbers of people".[15] Another author, Pitirim A. Sorokin, argues that internal disturbances increase during periods of rapid cultural transformation.[16] And, Mancur Olson maintains that economic downswings, and even upswings, produce severe social instability, conflict, and potential for revolution.[17]

One problem confronting studies of this nature is quantifying political violence. As Ted Gurr pointed out, "there are numerous problems associated with defining political violence and the relative scales used to measure it."[18] For example, difficulties result from differentiating between small and large scale civil war or organized and unorganized terrorism. Relying on the frequency of violent acts may distort the measure of violence for countries with small and extremely active terrorist groups. Also, qualifying the magnitude of violence may result in a biased measure of one particularly violent and isolated period.

Douglas Hibbs believes that the qualification of violence must meet three criteria. First, it must be anti-system in character (being at odds with the political system). Second, it must have political significance (pose a threat or severe inconvenience to the normal operation of the political elite). Third, it must be collective "mass"

activity in which murder, armed robbery or similar criminal acts are not counted.[19]

Hibbs' major complaint concerning the literature in this field is:

> Investigations that have dealt explicitly with causal relationships have often done so badly. Some have employed dubious techniques of parameter estimation and causal inference, and others are ambiguous about the way the final causal structures are derived.[20]

Hibbs also notes that analyses are often confined to limited subsamples of the potential data universe and that the use of a single measure of underdevelopment (as represented in Flannigan and Fogelman's study) is inappropriate. Concurring with Hibbs complaint is Leon Hurwitz, who, in his article, "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability," maintains the relationship between underdevelopment and violence is too complex to permit the use of a single aspect of underdevelopment to be exclusively employed to explain the incidence of violence.[21]

Hurwitz would probably defend the approach taken by the Schneiders and Gurr, but not Flannigan and Fogelman. Flannigan and Fogelman's use of a single measure of underdevelopment (percentage of work force engaged in agriculture) to explain the occurrence of violence is overly simplistic because violence is generally believed to occur in response to a combination of many types of underdevelopment. Although a single-dimensional measure of underdevelopment can usually be quantified, it does not

satisfy the theoretical requirement which recognizes many causes of violence.

A measure that does satisfy this requirement is the composite measure. Using a composite measure of underdevelopment is "intuitively more acceptable" because it incorporates many more social conditions which are thought to be linked to violence. However, when using a composite measure one must forego precise measurement because many social attributes do not easily lend themselves to mathematical indicators. Faced with a choice between the precision of a single-dimensional measure and the strong theoretical basis of a composite measure, Hurwitz contends that the suitable approach is the use of the composite measure of underdevelopment. Even though this method is not responsive to precise quantification, "it does not mean that the approach is without merit, however, for it rightfully recognizes that the concept of stability cannot be reduced to isolated variables."[22]

This investigation of the literature on cross-national causal analysis uncovered a number of issues concerning the nature of instability, violence, and underdevelopment. Perhaps the most apparent is the divergence of theories regarding the causes of violence. Whereas one study demonstrated economic underdevelopment is the leading cause of violence and instability others argued that it was social mobilization and relative deprivation.

A second issue is the debate over the use of single and composite measures of underdevelopment. An analysis of the relationship between underdevelopment and violence which employs a single-dimensional measure of underdevelopment to explain the absence or abundance of violence, such as Flannigan and Fogelman's use of percentage of work force engaged in agriculture, is usually accurate in that it generates a high degree of confidence in the statistical correlations. Nevertheless, this method cannot be considered theoretically valid due to the consensus that violence and instability result from a number of complex interacting types of underdevelopment--economic, political and social. Although the use of a composite measure of underdevelopment, like the Schneiders and Gurr study, is theoretically valid, it is not statistically accurate. Due to the inherent imprecision in quantifying many social conditions, such as democracy, institutionalization, and deprivation, a lower level of confidence results in the statistical correlation between a composite measure of underdevelopment and violence. This problem is illustrated by the fact that as more social conditions are included in the measure of underdevelopment, the less certain (statistically) we become of its relationship to violence. An examination of the definitions of democracy depicts this problem by showing the difficulty in quantifying this important social condition.

According to H.B. Mayo, there are so many special and personal meanings attached to the word democracy that it is difficult to arrive at a operational definition. In attempting to set the record straight, Mayo defines democracy as

> . . . a political system in which public policies are made on a majority basis by representatives subject to effective popular control at periodic elections which are conducted on the principle of political equality and under conditions of political freedom.[23]

Although other authors seem to support this definition, there remains, as Mayo points out, substantial differences. For example, Giovanni Sartori, in his article "What Democracy is Not," defines democracy as a condition where "no one can choose himself or invest himself with unconditional or unlimited power to rule."[24] Another definition by Dorothy Pickles notes that genuine democratic governments must involve dialogue between different strands of opinion, particularly between supporters and opponents of the political system.[25]

These differing interpretations of democracy demonstrate the problems facing attempts to discover a statistical relationship between democracy and political violence. In addition to the absence of a generally accepted definition of the concept, inherent difficulties exist with quantifying the word. For example, economic underdevelopment can easily be represented numerically as

percentage of work force engaged in agriculture or the number of unemployed, the balance of trade deficit, recession, or as inflation. However, the "principle of political equality," or the "dialogue between differing strands of opinion," cannot be represented numerically or consistently from one author to another.

Despite the absence of the treatment of communism in the discussion of the causes of instability and violence, a partial assessment of the theory of underdevelopment and violence can be made. Based on the analyses of the origins of violence, it cannot be stated with certainly that economic, political, and social underdevelopment cause instability and violence. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that instability and violence result from a myriad of social conditions which have thus far eluded attempts to illustrate their specific relationships to instability and violence. As a result, the theory of underdevelopment and violence can be considered theoretically valid yet statistically inaccurate. Because of the inability to specify the relationship among the various social conditions and their impact upon instability and violence, it is impossible to identify which type of underdevelopment is more likely to spark violence or to know if all three types of underdevelopment are to blame.

In conclusion, the relationships proposed by the theory of underdevelopment and violence would seem, based on these

interpretations, not to provide a foundation for policy. Without knowing the type and magnitude of underdevelopment that will cause violence, policymakers cannot establish a cause and effect relationship that will allow them to develop plans of action with definite goals. For example, if it were true that a 2.5 percent increase in GNP would bring about a corresponding drop in violence, then policymakers could then set their goal at a 2.5 percent increase in GNP. However, without knowledge of the true relationships between conditions of underdevelopment and violence the goal of a 2.5 percent increase in GNP would be meaningless. Therefore, the theory of underdevelopment and violence appears to leave policymakers with little knowledge except for the very general idea that various kinds of underdevelopment seem to be related in some way to the occurrence of violence.

The following chapter will examine the theory of underdevelopment and violence by looking at its practical application during the Alliance for Progress.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

[1]William H. Flannigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Patterns of Political Violence in Comparative Historical Perspective," Comparative Politics 3 (1971):11.

[2]Ibid., p.12.

[3]Ibid., p.13.

[4]Ibid., p.17.

[5]ibid., p.17.

[6]Peter and Anne Schneider, "Political Institutions and Comparative Violence: A Cross-National Analysis," Comparative Political Studies 4 (1971):70.

[7]Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," The American Political Science Review 55 (1961):49.

[8]Sammuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics 17 (April 1965):386.

[9]Schneider and Schneider, "Political Institutions and Comparative Violence," p.72.

[10]Ibid., p.75.

[11]Ted R. Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Study Using New Indices," American Political Science Review 62 (1968):1104.

[12]Ibid., p.1104.

[13]Ibid., p.1123.

[14]Douglas A. Hibbs, Mass Political Violence (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 43.

[15]William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 33.

[16]Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social Change and Cultural Dynamics (Boston: Horizon Books, 1957), p. 573.

[17]Mancur Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History 23 (1963):123

[18]Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife," p. 1125.

[19]Hibbs, Mass Political Violence, p. 40.

[20]Ibid., p. 4.

[21]Leon Hurwitz, "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability," Comparative Politics 5 (October 1972-July 1973):450

[22]Ibid., p. 458.

[23]H.B. Mayo, An Introduction To Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 70.

[24]Giovanni Sartori, "What Democracy is Not," in Empirical Democratic Theory, ed. Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), p. 36.

[25]Dorohty Pickles, Democracy (London: B.T. Batsford, 1970), p. 22.

CHAPTER III

The conclusions drawn from the review of the literature on cross-national causal analysis indicated that the theory of underdevelopment and violence is theoretically valid yet statistically inaccurate. Because of its statistical inaccuracy, questions remain as to whether certain relationships proposed by the theory truly exist. This chapter will attempt to appraise the success of the theory of underdevelopment and violence by observing its application as the basis of U.S. foreign policy during the Alliance for Progress.

This evaluation of the theory in the context of the Alliance for Progress depends on the perspective one adopts toward the Alliance itself. The three perspectives on the Alliance outlined by Abraham F. Lowenthal form the core of this examination.[1] Each of the three perspectives views the inspiration, implementation, and outcome of the Alliance differently. While the "liberal" perspective follows an historical development of U.S. policy, the "radical" perspective examines the nature of U.S.-Latin American relations, and the "bureaucratic" perspective focuses on the foreign policy process as a key to understanding the

Alliance.

PART I: THE LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE

Liberal theory, according to Lowenthal, assumes that a shared interest in hemispheric development exists between the United States and Latin America, and that past imperialistic policies such as "Gunboat" or "Dollar Diplomacy" are non-recurrent.[2] President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy is cited as pioneering this relationship. According to Lloyd Mecham, in A Survey of Untied States Latin America Relations:

> This new policy meant that [United States] interposition to protect private property might not be undertaken if it clashed with broader national policies. American citizens could no longer accept as a matter of course that they had the right to call for the troops or diplomatic interposition whenever or whatever danger appeared.[3]

Although military options waned, the U.S. "continued to employ the customary methods of diplomacy," such as financial inducements, protests, and economic measures "to create positive collaboration among the American states."[4] However, liberals conclude that Washington's reluctance to "send in the Marines" clearly signaled that the link between military protection of U.S. investments and national security was broken.[5]

Whatever goals Roosevelt had in mind for Latin America were overshadowed at the end of World War II; Europe and the

Marshall Plan dominated North American foreign policy.[6] Liberals agree that Washington's strategic concerns in the early postwar period focused primarily on Soviet confrontation in Europe and containment in Korea, and paid insufficient attention to Latin American problems and issues. As Washington turned its attention to the cold war, "Latin Americans watched with growing resentment the outpouring of U.S. assistance to Europe and Asia while their own requests for assistance were being rejected."[7]

It was not until the late 1950s that Latin America once again became the focus of U.S. attention. The angry mobs that greeted Richard Nixon on his tour of Latin America in 1958 and Castro's success in Cuba brought to the forefront of U.S. awareness growing anti-Americanism, communism, underdevelopment, and the resulting threat to U.S. security in the hemisphere.

In an attempt to address the mounting crisis in Latin America, the Alliance for Progress was conceived, according to the liberal perspective, as a "genuine U.S. government commitment to cooperate with Latin American countries."[8] Whereas U.S. interests were obvious considerations, it was believed that Washington's concerns were also compatible with, and largely dependent upon, social and economic progress in Latin America.[9] Furthermore, liberal writers maintain that "the Alliance represented a democratic alternative to Cuba's revolutionary socialist formula for

development."[10] Linking the conditions of economic, political, and social underdevelopment with increased instability and unrest, Washington suddenly became aware that "the spread of communism to the Western Hemisphere, a possibility long feared by the United States, had become a reality."[11] What Washington hoped for was that the Alliance would enable politically moderate elements to bring about economic development and fundamental social change within the framework of representative political institutions and thus preempt the revolutionary forces of the left.[12]

Liberal accounts of the Alliance's performance differ, but all seem to agree that U.S. actions, initially benevolent, succumbed to unfortunate occurrences, were handicapped by uncontrollable forces, and lacked necessary understanding of Latin American politics. Other reasons for its lack of success include the death of it most ardent supporter, John F. Kennedy, Teodoro Moscoso's replacement as Alliance coordinator and half-hearted implementation. Finally, North Americans' penchant for quick results led Washington officials to seek an immediate political impact of a long-term program.

George C. Lodge, in his book Engines of Change, observed that a major stumbling block to creating a truly multilateral program was United States dominance. What was originally designed to be an inter-American program of mutual coordination and implementation, became by "default"

a program of bilateral rather than multilateral relations. Failure can also be attributed to Washington's belief that Latin American governments had the will and capacity to enact the sweeping economic, political, and social reforms envisioned by the Alliance's founders. The truth was that many governments were restricted on both accounts. As Lodge notes:

> This restriction derives from two characteristics of such societies: A majority of the people exist outside any significant relationship to the government, beyond jurisdiction, reach or interest; and government tends to be the creature of oligarchic power-holders whose controlling interest is in maintaining the status quo.[13]

The list of failures and problems identified by the liberal writers is extensive. One that merits further investigation is the role of Latin America's middle class. Lowenthal proposes that liberal writers, along with the founders of the Alliance, assumed that conditions and developments in Latin America had led to the beginnings of a politically important middle class. At the time of the conception of the Alliance, there was a growing belief among U.S. policymakers that the swelling middle class of Latin America would someday replace the traditional oligarchic ruling process by one of debate and compromise among conflicting interest groups not unlike the United States political process.[14] However, as many liberal writers concluded, the middle class did not evolve or act as predicted.

Considered a great influence during the Alliance's beginnings is John J. Johnson's book, Political Change in Latin America: The Growth of The Middle Sectors. Johnson argued that Latin America's middle class economic, political, and social strength would grow rather than decline in the decade of the 1960s and that the art of compromise, unknown or disaffected in the past, has been elevated to a new level which asserts to balance political antagonisms.[15] Identified as "stabilizers" or "harmonizers," the middle class was considered the very force which would ensure the success of the Alliance. Due to its non-homogeneous structure, the middle class represented a modernizing element, according to Johnson, devoted to a wide range of aims such as public education, industrialization, economic growth, and social welfare.[16]

With its roots firmly planted in industrialization and urbanization, the middle class was judged committed to maintaining open avenues for socio-economic mobility. As these opportunities are unlocked and used, more individuals are assimilated into the middle class structure of society and as a result, come to perpetuate and expand these approaches of mobility and thus the impetus of that mobility--industrialization.[17]

In their pursuit of economic, political, and social equality, the middle class comes into conflict with the "patronage" system of the ruling elite. The ensuing

struggle finds the middle class allied with the lower class and even "advocating the admission of these classes to the body politic and their more active participation in the social and economic advantages."[18] Rather than a marriage of convenience, the two groups subscribe to the goal of an open society with enforced standards of equal participation. The needs of the middle class require an alliance with the lower classes to face the traditional elite and to maintain or increase avenues for their own mobility and in turn the lower classes, "thus making it a willing instrument in the transformation of social and economic institutions."[19]

In Louis Ratinoff's work, The New Urban Groups: The Middle Classes, Johnson's theory is cited as the customary theory . The alternate view contrasts sharply with its rival. Basic to this approach is the assumption that the middle class, "in some circumstances, represents a force committed to maintaining the traditional social system."[20] Although there are means for economic, political, and social mobility, they are restricted by norms imposed by the traditional elite. This is characterized as a system of patronage rather than merit . Newly arriving middle class individuals become socialized by the traditional norms of patronage and ultimately come to perpetuate them. As for the middle class's aspirations for maintaining open avenues of mobility and allying themselves with the lower classes, Ratinoff notes that it is

> . . . dependent upon the system's ability to satisfy the middle classes' minimum aspirations. If the system provides a reasonable degree of satisfaction for such aspirations, the middle classes tend to model their behavior and standards on those of the traditional social elite.[21]

If the system does not provide these minimum requirements, the middle class collides with the traditional elite "often embracing populist ideologies built on social justice and a sense of freedom."[22] However, the reality in Latin America indicated that although "the middle class, in their rise to power, introduce all kinds on innovations, they did not commit themselves to the establishment of social order based on middle class values."[23] Ratinoff concludes:

> Middle class policies simply preserved the established positions and recognized poverty as a fact of the social system. The impulse toward a better distribution of power, prestige, and wealth steadily declined in importance, and the middle sectors showed more interest in securing for themselves the advantages of the desired status, in a social organization where the presence of poverty has heightened the privileges of the groups in power.[24]

Concurring with this line of thought is Victor Alba, who in his book Alliance Without Allies, discredits the idea that the middle class of Latin America was a modernizing force dedicated to the goals of the Alliance for Progress. In examining the "myth" of the middle class desire for economic, political, and social advancement, Alba concludes that the middle class rejected change and thus served only to satisfy their own needs and those of the traditional

ruling elite.[25]

In another analysis of the middle class of Latin America, Jośe Nun set out to dispel the popular belief that the military was primarily a tool of the oligarchy used to suppress the desires of the middle and lower classes. Nun proposes that the Latin American military, because of its predominantly middle class make up, more often comes to the defense of the middle class who are committed to maintaining their position in society. According to Nun, most military officers come from urban middle class backgrounds which form the basis of much of the military's political convictions.[26] These opinions on the economic, political, and social direction of the country manifest themselves when confrontation appears between the lower class desire for reform and the elite's desire to maintain the status quo. Reacting out of fear that the confrontation may push the oligarchy towards repression and the lower classes toward revolution, the middle class relies on the armed forces to keep either group from going too far.[27]

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the liberal perspective of the Alliance for Progress. But perhaps the most important is that, if the liberal perspective is correct, policymakers lacked a clear understanding of the socio-political dynamics of Latin American societies. The architects of the Alliance believed that the growing middle class of Latin America, like their counterparts in the

United States, were devoted to economic prosperity, social equality, and political democratization. These very same conditions, if nurtured and allowed to flourish, would bring about enhanced security for the U.S. by diminishing instability, violence, and the threat of communist encroachment in Latin America. Nevertheless, experience illustrated that these middle class groups did not act as predicted and in many cases helped to perpetuate the continuing cycle of underdevelopment and violence.

In conclusion, the application of the theory of underdevelopment and violence during the Alliance for progress, according to the liberal perspective, was a failure due to the incorrect assumption that the middle class of Latin America would be willing and able to carry out development programs.

Although the theory of underdevelopment and violence, as it was illustrated in chapter one of this paper, did not discuss the role of Latin America's middle class, the theory's call for economic liberalization, political democratization, and social reform certainly reflects middle class values and desires. This point is illuminated by liberal writers who indicated that policymakers during the Alliance believed Latin America's middle class was evolving much like the middle class in the United States.

Therefore, from this assumption, it seems evident that the theory of underdevelopment and violence was conceived

and implemented exclusively from the perspective of U.S. middle class values and desires--not Latin American. The cause of the Alliance's problems may be attributed to the attempt to apply U.S. middle class values to the completely different middle class values in Latin America. As a result, the obstacles encountered in applying the theory of underdevelopment and violence during the Alliance for Progress resulted not as much from the assumption that underdevelopment caused violence, but that the remedy for overcoming violence through the extension of development assistance, which reflected U.S. middle class values, would not apply in countries that had completely different middle class values.

The liberal perspective provides one viewpoint for assessing the Alliance for Progress and the theory of underdevelopment and violence. The following section will examine an alternative approach called the radical perspective.

PART II: THE RADICAL PERSPECTIVE

The "radical" perspective characteristically includes one theme: United States foreign policies serve primarily the expansive interests of North American capitalism. What liberals regard as a compatibility of interests, radicals see as a conflict between the United States' urge to dominate and Latin Americas' desire to be sovereign. Big business dictates policy, and Washington, always eager to support these interests, accommodates businesses through its foreign policy.

The radical perspective represents an amalgamation of theories grounded on Marxist-Leninist analysis of capitalism, dependency, modes of production, imperialism, and revolution. A common perception among radicals is that U.S. suspicion and fear of Latin America is generated by the perceived threat of communism, nationalism, and revolution to U.S. corporate and strategic concerns.

Rejecting the notion that U.S. imperialism occurred only during overt military intervention, as liberal theory suggests, the radical perspective views imperialism as a "multi-dimensional concept" whose components are in persistent interplay. James Petras notes, in his book

Politics and Social Structure in Latin America, that to consider imperialism solely in economic or military terms is nonsense. Imperialism is carried out through all levels of contact. "Even voluntary student and intellectual associations are used by the U.S. government to transmit values among the educated classes of the third world to facilitate the acceptance of U.S. economic penetration."[1]

While liberals regarded the Good Neighbor policy as an improvement in U.S.-Latin American relations, radicals see it as a continuation of U.S. dominance of Latin America. David Green's analysis of the Good Neighbor policy, in The Containment of Latin America, suggests that U.S. policy was based on containing Latin American nationalism because of its threat to U.S. business and strategic concerns.[2] For example, Green argues that the 1938 expropriation of U.S. oil interests by Mexico would have prompted considerable effort by United States policymakers to head off the spread of nationalism in Latin America if not for the advent of World War II.[3]

A dominant radical characterization of the nature of U.S.-Latin American relations draws from dependency theory. According to Dale Johnson, in his article "Dependency and The International System," dependency occurs when one or more countries' economies are "conditioned" by the expansion of another dominant country. This relationship assumes dependency when the dependent country can develop

(economically) only as a reflection of the dominant country's economic expansion. Linked in part to Latin America's colonial experience, dependency encompasses reliance upon one or two exports (usually cash-crop agriculture), need for foreign capital, and foreign ownership of important economic sectors. Johnson concludes that this relationship results from and is perpetuated by the imperatives generated in the structure and functioning of the U.S. economic system.[4]

Radicals argue that one of the many components of dependency, foreign investment, has been integrated into vital sectors of Latin America economies (industry, services, agriculture, and consumer goods) at such an alarming rate that it has come to determine and influence many countries' manner of economic development. According to Teotonio dos Santos, in his article "The Changing Structure of Foreign Investment in Latin America," the roots of this present crisis can be traced back to industrialization. Because of insufficient domestic capital and investment needed to sustain economic development, Latin America turned toward foreign money. As foreign investment began to switch from the "colonial exporting enclave" (agriculture and mining) to the manufacturing sector, more corporations became "affiliated" with North America and European firms, allowed secured monopolies over key markets, and thus furthered dependence on foreign imports and created

a financial dependence on much needed foreign capital.[5] Santos concludes that "there is growing contradiction between the control exercised by foreign capital over the economy and the technical capacity of the [Latin American] economy to support itself."[6]

Latin America's response to these conditions was mixed. In many countries the backlash of anti-Americanism generated by the policies of multinationals and the U.S. government has led to expropriation and nationalization of U.S. businesses, as well as attempts to break away from reliance on U.S. manufactured and imported products. Even under conditions of import substitution, in which countries establish industries designed to compete with and eventually overtake foreign imported goods, Latin America still must rely on the importation of raw materials, intermediate parts, and the machinery and equipment necessary to establish production.[7] Compounding Latin America's difficulties is the lack of export markets, a condition often attributed to the barriers imposed by developed countries to protect their own businesses. In Latin America, concludes Dale Johnson, "there is little expectation that significant markets can be found for exports of manufactured products that might loosen dependence upon primary exports."[8]

The radical view of the Alliance for Progress follow from their use of dependency theory. What liberal accounts

describe as a genuine program of economic, social, and political development, radicals see a "sophisticated instrument" to advance U.S. private economic interests. Characterized as a program for the protection of investments, earnings, and new profit making opportunities, radicals argue that the Alliance "amounted in short to a government administered welfare program for U.S. investors."[9]

To the radical view, the rhetoric surrounding the Alliance for Progress was just that, rhetoric. Reforms and other goals proclaimed by the Alliance "fundamentally conflicted with U.S. corporate interests and the U.S. corporate system in Latin America."[10] David Horowitz, in his book Empire and Revolution: A Radical Interpretation of Contemporary History, comments that Washington "openly abandoned" the idea of encouraging development in Latin America. Instead, it became an "imperial guardian of a prototype neo-colonial system" in which its instrument of subjugation was the Alliance for Progress.[11]

With a similar interpretation, Simon Hanson, in his book Dollar Diplomacy Modern Style, suggests that the Alliance marked the revival of an old policy. Hanson theorizes that "during the decade of the Alliance for Progress dollar diplomacy was revived with a scope that dwarfed the earlier episodes."[12] It was a "new era" where U.S. interests and property were protected by intervention

so great that "the American Ambassador had indeed become not the second most important man, but actually the most important man in the country, the man to see, as far as public policy goes."[13] Also termed "welfare diplomacy," the Alliance represented a pursuit of U.S. interests in which the primary instrument of policy was money, and the central tenet of policy was that money could solve any problem.[14]

According to this line of reasoning, the Alliance worked on two fronts. First, it represented a subsidy for U.S. overseas investments, and second, it used economic assistance to pressure and influence Latin American governments. In the case of influence turned outright threat of sanction, Hanson points to U.S. dealings with Argentina. It was speculated that Argentina was influenced, during the early years of the Alliance, into making bad deals with U.S. oil companies. Inevitably Argentine reaction was unfavorable to what Hanson describes as "foisted" business deals. The outpouring of Argentine support to renege on the contracts forced a U.S. response. Hanson recalls that

> The White House rushed in to warn Argentina that anything done to [change the] relationships with the oil companies...would meet instant reprisal in terms of aid from the United States.[15]

The short and long-term benefits of the Alliance were limited to a few corporations. The cost fell directly on the U.S. taxpayer. Eliminating investment risks by shifting

those risks to the taxpayer was central to the Alliance. The U.S. citizen was unaware that "the evacuation of unprofitable investments by private corporations was an objective of the Alliance."[16] While liberals believed that a separation of national and private interests had been achieved, Hanson proposes that "the corporate interest would be attached to the national interest, and in a choice given priority over the national interest."[17] Though the Alliance was designed to benefit U.S. interests by promoting corporate interests, it failed to do so. Hanson concludes:

> What happened in the decade of the Alliance was that U.S. bureaucrats had come to realize, if not admit, that the thesis of dollar diplomacy modern style had proven to be a failure. It was impossible to install democratic governments by selective donations. It was impossible to defend private investments by selective allocations of donations and indeed the device had proved counter-productive by providing an alternative to provision of a suitable climate of investment.[18]

As a result, the Alliance could no longer be justified to the American public. According to Hanson, its fruitless drain on the U.S. taxpayer could not be concealed in light of the lack of progress. By 1970 the Alliance died quietly, its programs and what little funds were available where transferred to other inter-American agencies.

The radical's analysis of the success of the Alliance for Progress rests upon the supposition that the very nature of U.S. involvement in Latin America is exploitive. In the radical view the Alliance for Progress was never intended to

benefit Latin America. Its purpose was to subsidize U.S. foreign investors. Its aim also included protecting U.S. overseas businesses by withholding or releasing Alliance funds to Latin American governments.

In conclusion, the radical perspective represents the view that U.S. interests, however cleverly disguised, are not reflected by the theory of underdevelopment and violence as it was explained in chapter one of this paper or by the liberal perspective's account of the Alliance for Progress. However, if we overlook the radical assumption that U.S. policy is driven by exploitation and protection of U.S. businesses, insight can be gained as to the viability of the theory of underdevelopment and violence.

Considering that U.S. business interests are not necessarily paramount to U.S. foreign policy, but do represent an important force, the value of the radical view emerges in its recognition that these interests did not coincide with the theory behind the Alliance. Whether at its outset or somewhere in the process, business interests were clearly important considerations during the Alliance for Progress. What the radical perspective provides is the recognition that U.S. foreign policy is affected by business interests and that these interests are not necessarily devoted to economic, political, and social development in Latin America.

The following section examines the "bureaucratic"

perspective. The bureaucratic analysis focuses on the foreign policy process. This view provides further evidence that interests, other than those loyal to economic, political, and social development in Latin America, can manipulate policy to their own views.

PART III: THE BUREAUCRATIC PERSPECTIVE

Unlike the liberal and radical perspectives, the "bureaucratic" perspective analyzes foreign policy by determining the roles of the participants and their effect on the creation and implementation of policy. To the bureaucratic perspective, foreign policy, like domestic policy, represents the culmination of efforts of individuals and organizations, inside and outside government, to express their interests and have them incorporated in policy choices. The interaction of these participants entails a "series of overlapping and inter-locking bargaining processes."[1] Therefore, knowledge of the interworkings of this process--who the players were, what their concerns and roles were, and where the interaction was located--will lead to a better understanding of the outcome of U.S. foreign policy.

The pioneer of this approach, Graham T. Allison, rejected the traditional single actor model as a comprehensive approach to the study of U.S. foreign policy in favor of the organizational and bargaining models. Allison suggests that treating governments as purposive individuals obscures the influence of others. According to

Allison, "the maker of government policy is not one calculating individual but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors."[2]

Due to the United States' expanded role in world affairs after World War II, numerous organizations and individuals began, and succeeded in, challenging the State Department's monopoly in foreign affairs.[3] As a result, various interests came to exert influence in the formation and execution of U.S. foreign policy. Even within the government itself, countless agencies labored to ensure that their views and interests were represented.

Next to the executive branch, the most visibly influential organization within government is Congress. With its constitutionally vested powers, such as appropriation of funds, ratification of treaties, and limited control over the use of the military, Congress naturally inspires the formation and execution of foreign policy.[4] However, there are government organizations that possess equally effective powers to influence the direction of U.S. foreign policy.

The agencies and departments of what is referred to as the intelligence community are charged with collection, analysis, and dissemination of critical knowledge that forms the basis of most foreign policy decisions. The opportunity to weight and bias this information is clearly present but, as Allison points out, this may not be the case due to a

central characteristic. Like most government bureaucracies, the intelligence community "functions less as integral parts of a unitary head that entertains preconceptions and theories than as organs that perform their tasks in a habitual fashion."[5] Although an established routine furnishes guidelines that allows agencies and departments to function in a coherent fashion, it can also inhibit the execution of policy once those guidelines are by-passed. For example, when organizations are confronted with a foreign policy that is not completely understood or lacks clearly defined procedures, "their performance is likely to appear sluggish and inappropriate to external critics, and their patterns of behavior are likely to seem encrusted and incapable of change to outsiders."[6]

Another characteristic of governmental organizations is a will to maintain some measure of independent action and to expand its area of responsibility.[7] In this respect, organizations are both imperialistic and self-serving. To maintain their semi-sovereignty, agencies and departments must justify appropriation requests while fending off attempts to reduce their budget. Consequently, competition arises among organizations over the inability to define organizational jurisdiction of many tasks, which usually results in one agency being pitted against another over the responsibility of doing a job. How does this affect foreign policy? A clear example provided by Graham Allison recounts

the ten day delay in getting U-2 reconnaissance photos of Cuban missile bases to President Kennedy because of a jurisdictional dispute between the Air Force and the CIA over who would conduct the U-2 mission.[8]

Foreign policies regularly affect private organizations. They, in turn, try to ensure that policies are favorable by "bringing a wide variety of aims and perspectives to bear with differing degrees of effectiveness at various points in the policy-making process."[9] An example of this would be the effects of both domestic and international business organizations. At times businesses within the United States have attempted to persuade the government to restrict, through tariffs for example, a foreign competitor; international businesses may attempt to convince the government to protect their overseas holdings and investments from expropriation, nationalization, and burdensome taxes. In this sense foreign policies can reflect an organization's need for government cooperation and also how effectively organizations tie their interests to national politics. However, the U.S. government often requires the cooperation of these same organizations in order to implement foreign policy. An extreme example would be economic boycott or disinvestment, another more subtle from would be the promotion, through tax incentives, of private investment in foreign countries to augment the U.S. government's foreign economic policies. In the case of the

Alliance and the Commission Report, both called for increased private investment to aid economic development in Latin America. As the business-government relationship becomes apparent, it is evident that business interests often fulfill important roles in the creation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

Individuals also may be important actors in U.S. foreign policy. Those who seem to exert the most influence are usually leaders of organizations inside and outside the government. Clearly, financial and political strength is decisive but equally important is how a leader's personal traits--honesty, integrity, and credibility--are perceived by others. Congressmen, religious leaders, business executives and agency directors, for example, work to shape and mold government behavior through a series of bargaining games .[10] These individuals seek to promote their interests which are molded by their perceptions of national security, their organization, and their domestic and personal concerns.[11]

Because the bureaucratic perspective focuses on the creation and implementation of policy, an analysis of the Alliance for Progress must begin with an investigation of the individuals responsible for its creation. The architects of the Alliance were principally scholars and Latin America specialists eager to employ the comprehensive plans of the Kennedy administration. According to

Lowenthal, they were attentive to Latin American views, and committed to inter-American cooperation.[12] Latin American specialists Douglas Dillon and R. R. Rubottum directed much of the negotiating and fact finding for the Alliance.[13] Dillon was U.S. representative at the signing of the Alliance Charter, at Punta del Este, and was later criticized for committing the U.S. to a multimillion dollar program without Congressional approval. Presidential assistant Adolf Berle, "the man who provided the link between the Good Neighbor policy and the Alliance for Progress," was also responsible for Latin American and Caribbean leaders' access to Kennedy in the policy formation process.[14] The Latin American Task Force, which provided the foundation of the Alliance, consisted of Berle, Teodoro Moscoso, Morales Carrion, Robert Goodwin, and three U.S. professors (Lincoln Gordon, Robert Alexander, and Arthur Whitacker). The engineers of the Alliance were a small inner circle of Latin American specialists mainly from academia; they were not dominated by business interests. On the contrary, most of Kennedy's appointments reflected the exclusion of many traditional foreign policy players, the business community among them. Of Kennedy's first 200 appointments, 6 percent were from business and 18 percent from universities, compared to 36 percent and 6 percent respectively during the Eisenhower administration.[15]

In addition to the exclusion of many traditional

participants from the policy formation process, the crisis tone of the administration's appraisal of Latin America further confined the creation of policy to a small group. This feeling of urgency in the Kennedy administration's arguments for Latin American assistance was recorded by Arthur Schlesinger. According to Schlesinger "the old order in Latin America was breaking up. There was no longer any question of preserving the status quo."[16]

Writers who assume the bureaucratic perspective argue that the administration presented the Alliance as a certain cure for an inevitable crisis. Just as a domestic crisis mobilizes public, congressional, and bureaucratic support for the President, the same can be said of foreign policy. Stanley Hoffman, in Gulliver's Travels, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy, argues that the policy making process is "normally" an ordeal with infighting reaching vast proportions. However, "a crisis abroad acts like a truce at home and makes it easier to restrict policymaking to a small inner circle."[17] Although crisis decisions often lead to improvised and abrupt resolutions based on unsteady compromises resulting in short-term rather than long-term solutions, when disaster is imminent, remarks Hoffman, "there may not be time to integrate the different services and their varying frames of analysis before acting."[18]

While the formation of the Alliance for Progress appeared to be restricted to a small group, it clearly

became evident that its implementation would not. The groups and individuals assigned to administer the Alliance programs were probably the first to regain some measure of influence over its direction. Christopher Mitchell, in "Dominance and Fragmentation of U.S Latin American Policy," portrays the reintroduction of these groups as the outcome of a Presidential resolve inadequate to withstand the fragmentary political pressures. As a result, "diplomats, military men, and private pressure groups, (especially investors and exporters), all pressured for and regained considerable margin for independent action."[19] Concurring with this appraisal, Robert Wagner commented that the process by which Latin American policies were implemented during the Alliance, "seems to have been characterized by the same fragmentation of power and difficulty of achieving a set of political goals insulated from the demands of private pressure groups that characterize the rest of American politics."[20] Two groups, whose influence grew during the Alliance--private businesses and governmental organizations--had a substantial impact upon the execution of policy.

The Alliance lasted ten years, and drew a myriad competitors into the policy process. They could be observed each year as the Alliance budget request came before Congress. The Congress made certain that interests outside those responsible for the initial creation of the Alliance

had at least a chance to air their views.[21] Although briefly mentioned in the Charter of Punta del Este, and seemingly left out of the policy formation process, businesses became influential in the implementation of the Alliance's programs.[22] The Inter-American Development Bank, along with other international and domestic lending institutions, private investors and international corporations, not only joined government efforts to revitalize Latin American economies, but made certain their views and interests were represented.[23]

An example of their impact was the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, which according to Levinson and DeOnis, "marked the reintroduction of business interests in foreign policy and effectively tied the foreign assistance programs of the Alliance to the protection of overseas investment."[24] The amendment compelled the President to suspend economic aid to any country that expropriated the property of a U.S. company, repudiated a contract with a U.S. company, or made a U.S. company subject to discriminatory taxation or administration.[25]

Another illustration of the influence business was able to wield emerged from a dispute between the government of Peru and the International Petroleum Company (IPC). Nationalistic pressures within Peru prompted an attempt to nationalize the country's oil deposits which were owned by

IPC--a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey. Washington's response was a temporary freeze, (lasting almost two years), on assistance to Peru--an indication that Washington was strongly influenced by IPC and Standard Oil of New Jersey.[26] A further demonstration of Standard Oil's leverage was the apparent disregard to include the State Department in negotiations between IPC and Peru.[27]

In addition to businesses, various agencies and departments which were initially left out of the creation of the Alliance, but charged with administering its assistance programs, were able to alter policy greatly. One agency in particular, the Agency for International Development (AID), which processed loan applications, engineered development programs, and finally audited those programs, had a great influence on policy.

The procedures which AID established to distribute assistance often became a hinderance to the smooth operation of the Alliance. Compounding the complex and cumbersome array of guidelines for filing loan applications was the fact that many Latin American countries were ill-equipped to submit detailed and comprehensive requests and unable to distribute funds effectively. As a result, AID's loan staff officers would often encounter delays authorizing and allocating assistance funds due to the obstacles of getting Latin American foreign ministers to sign authorizations. The delays were frequently ascribed to difficulty in translating

important clauses, and lack of a full-time legal staff.[28]

Although administrative procedures could be refined and improved, AID was besieged by interest groups, who, out of fear of the growing leftist and communist influences in Latin America, pressured for a re-defining of Alliance goals. AID field officers, representing in-country Latin American development and reform interests, and AID officials in Washington, representing lobbyists, Congressmen, and other agencies and departments, became embroiled in a political battle over the direction of Alliance goals; the AID field officers ultimately lost.[29] The outcome of this reinterpretation of the Alliance's emphasis resulted in adopting quick-fix anti-communist programs rather than long-term economic, political, and social reforms. According to Washington AID representative, Philip Golden, there were three types of Latin American assistance, "very high priority, hysterical, and if-we-don't-make-this-loan-the-communists-will-take-over-the-country."[30] The effect of this strategy--attempting to counteract leftist influence--led agencies such as AID to seek projects which would eagerly be accepted by Latin American governments, implemented rapidly, concretely obvious to the local people, and decidedly short-term in nature.[31]

Riordan Roett's analysis of Alliance programs in Northeast Brazil concluded that the emphasis on combating leftist influences with short-term remedies rather than

long-term economic, political, and social development programs encouraged U.S. agencies to bypass local development coalitions and become embroiled in political infighting among state and national levels of Latin American governments. AID's involvement with Brazil's Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE) not only highlights the suspicions held by AID officials of communist influences in local coalitions, but the overall politicalization of Alliance efforts in Brazil.[32]

Through the dedicated leadership of Celso Furtado and the administrative ingenuity of SUDENE, an innovative plan for economic, political, and social reform in Brazil's Northeast region was formulated. With Furtado's personal reception by President Kennedy and the apparent support of the plan by AID's Northeast Survey Team, the stage seemed set for the implementation of Alliance programs. However, AID officials in Washington, believing that SUDENE had been infiltrated by communist elements and its staff was attempting to challenge the traditional political power-holders, felt that SUDENE should be excluded from overseeing the assistance program.[33] Another reason for SUDENE's diminished role was AID's desire to circumvent SUDENE's perceived efforts to undermine the political power and support for Governor Alves of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Norte, who was being challenged by leftist

elements and the development coalition organized by SUDENE. Once given the go ahead by AID representatives in Washington, Alves established his own development staff, independent of SUDENE, to execute the program. A further hobbling of SUDENE's role came about when Brazilian President João Goulart, needing Alves' political support, allowed the program to proceed without SUDENE's approval or supervision, thereby delegating authority to AID and ALVES' staff. The results of this program allowed Alves to spurn state development programs, escape SUDENE supervision, fortify his own political position, and release state funds, that would have otherwise gone into a development program, for Alves' political activities.[34] Roett concludes that the over-all impact of U.S. aid in Northeast Brazil counteracted Brazil's modernization efforts in that area.[35]

In conclusion, the bureaucratic perspective presents a critique of the Alliance for Progress based on knowledge of the roles and interests of the groups and individuals who create, influence, and implement foreign policy. Writers who represent the bureaucratic perspective maintain that the Alliance for Progress was conceived in a non-traditional setting were the normal foreign policy participants were excluded. Based on the crisis tone of the administration's appraisal of Latin America and the president's desire to restrict policy formation to a small inner circle of advisors, those organizations and individuals responsible

for implementing the Alliance were omitted from its creation, but however, were able to gain considerable influence over its direction once the programs were put into action.

Two groups that gained considerable leverage over the direction of Alliance policy were U.S. businesses and the Agency for International Development. The successful reintroduction of business interests can be traced to the passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment. The resurgence of AID's influence can be tracked to the political battle over the desire to counter communist influence with short-term highly visible programs rather than the more long-term development plans originally envisioned by the Alliance's founders.

The influence of businesses relates to the belief that the Alliance proposed greater Latin American economic development and self-sufficiency. From a Latin American perspective, the United States seemed prepared to relinquish its control over national means of production--the oil deposits in Peru, for example. However, what the creators of the Alliance envisioned did not correspond to the desires of those businesses which held interests in or controlled the national production capabilities of Latin American nations. Once Latin American countries sought to gain control of these foreign owned means of production, U.S. businesses pressured for and were able to block many Latin

American attempts to expropriate and nationalize U.S. held business interests.

The influence of the Agency for International Development can be traced to the determination that Latin American societies faced immediate threat from communist forces. In response to this, AID was able to reorient the thrust of Alliance programs away from long-term economic, political, and social reforms toward short-term highly visible anti-communist programs.

The influence of AID was also linked to the belief that Latin American governments must initiate democratic reforms. The very basis of the Alliance itself--increasing the participation and political influence of non-traditional political players in the nation's economic, political, and social development--could not be balanced with the fact that U.S. assistance was funneled through the very same political forces that were committed to maintaining the traditional political system. In the Case of Brazil, AID's efforts to initiate development plans and increase democratic political participation, threatened to diffuse the political power base of the groups with which AID had to work to institute these development plans. As a result, Alliance efforts became tethered to various political struggles between Latin American power holders and newly emerging groups that the Alliance was originally designed to bring about.

The bureaucratic perspective outlines one aspect of the

Alliance for Progress which is useful in evaluating the theory of underdevelopment and violence. In the concluding chapter which follows, lessons learned from the three perspectives of the Alliance for Progress as well as the analysis of the theoretical foundations of the theory of underdevelopment and violence will be gathered together in order evaluate the theory's viability as a basis for United States foreign policy.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER III PART I

[1]Abraham F. Lowenthal, "United States Policy Towards Latin America: "Liberal," "Radical," and "Bureaucratic," Perspectives," in New Perspectives On Latin America: Political Conflict and Social Change, ed. Karen L. Rammer and Gilbert W. Merk (New Jersey: MSS Information Corp., 1976), p. 105-135.

[2]According to Samuel Bemis "imperialism was never deep-rooted in the character of the people [of the United States], it was essentially protective imperialism, designed to protect, first the security of the Continental Republic, and next the security of the new world against intervention. It was an imperialism against imperialism. It did not last long and it was not really bad." Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of The United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943), p. 308.

[3]J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States Latin American Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 114.

[4]Bryce Wood, The Making of The Good Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 159.

[5]Martin C. Needler, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 18.

[6]Speculation as to the ultimate goal of Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy includes a plan for a hemisphere-wide defense pact. According to Edwin Lieuwen, "the United States was doing much to prepare Latin America psychologically for joining a hemisphere wide defense program to meet external threats." Edwin Lieuwen, United States Policy in Latin America (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1965), p. 72.

[7]Harvey S. Perloff, The Alliance For Progress: A Social Invention in The Making (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 10.

[8]Lowenthal, "U.S. Policy Towards Latin America," p. 106.

[9]One such argument, presented by Lincoln Gordon, proposed that Washington's interest in the success of the Alliance was not a selfish, but rather "a national interest which converges with our Latin American neighbors." Arguing that the Alliance's goals of economic and social development are "siamese twins," Gordon proposed that the benefits of economic development must be accompanied by the distribution of those benefits among all classes and regions of the country. Gordon concludes that "the Alliance for Progress does not permit the continued existence of large masses of forgotten men." Lincoln Gordon, Growth Policies and The International Order (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1979), p. 12, 122.

[10]Jerome Levinson and Juan De Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on The Alliance for Progress (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), p. 7.

[11]Perloff, The Alliance For Progress, p. 19.

[12]Levinson and De Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way, p. 7.

[13]George C. Lodge, Engines of Change: U.S. Interests and Revolution in Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1970), p. 363.

[14]Lowenthal, "U.S. Policy Towards Latin America," p. 107.

[15]John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of The Middle Sectors (California: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 194.

[16]Ibid., p. 8.

[17]Ibid., p. 63. Johnson believes the social destiny of the middle-class depends both upon the opportunity for expanding and rationalizing urban productive activities, and upon the establishment of individual merit as the stratification principle." Ibid., p. 63.

[18]Ibid., p. 64.

[19]Ibid., p. 64.

[20]Louis Ratinoff, "The New Urban Groups: The Middle Classes," in Elites in Latin America, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (New York: Oxford University Press,

1967), p. 68.

[21]Ibid., p. 69.

[22]Ibid., p. 69.

[23]Ibid., p. 84.

[24]Ibid., p. 89.

[25]Victor Alba, Alliance Without Allies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), p. 8.

[26]Jose Nun, Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis and The Military Coup (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1969), p. 18.

[27]Jose Nun, "A Latin America Phenomenon. The Middle Class Military Coup," in Latin America Reform or Revolution?, ed. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (Conn. Fawcett Publications, 1968), p. 147.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER III PART II

[1]James Petras, Politics and Social Structure in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 310.

[2]David Green, The Containment of Latin America; A History of the Myth and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 291.

[3]Ibid., p. 296. Washington's attempts to pressure the Mexicans fell short in the face of strong support and popular backing of the Cardenas administration, preoccupation with Europe and Asia, and organized opposition to U.S. intervention. Ibid., p. 297.

[4]Dale Johnson, "Dependency and The International System," in Dependency and underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy, ed. James Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank, and Dale Johnson (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), p. 71.

[5]Teotonio dos Santos, "The Changing Structure of Foreign Investment in Latin America," in Latin America; Reform or Revolution, ed. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1968), p. 96.

[6]Ibid., p. 97.

[7]Johnson, "Dependency and The International System," p. 77.

[8]Ibid., p. 77.

[9]Petras, Politics and Social Structure in Latin America, p. 239.

[10]David Horowitz, Empire and Revolution: A Radical Interpretation of Contemporary History (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 247.

[11]Ibid., p. 249.

[12]Simon G. Hanson, Dollar Diplomacy Modern Style (Washington: Inter-American Affairs Press, 1970), p. 36.

[13]Ibid., p. 37.

[14]Ibid., p. 23.

[15]Ibid., p. 26. The incident ended with the installation of a military dictatorship, which Hanson credits to U.S. meddling, a reversal of policy by the Argentine government and reissuing of the oil contracts. American businesses pressured Washington into recognizing the new government, which it did enthusiastically. Ibid., p. 23.

[16]Ibid., p. 29.

[17]Ibid., p. 34.

[18]Ibid., p. 180.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER III PART III

[1]Lowenthal, "U.S. Policy Towards Latin America," p. 113.

[2]Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown Company, 1971), p. 3.

[3]William I. Bacchus contends that the nature of U.S. foreign relations changed as the United States increased its business, political, military, cultural, and social contacts throughout the world. The domestic interests representing these contacts began to displace the State Department's dominance in foreign affairs--a process in which "the net effect was to bring to the fore many competitors for control of American foreign policy." William I. Bacchus, Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country Director System (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 5.

[4]The War Powers Resolution, adopted by Congress in 1969, represents legislative efforts to regain foreign policy initiative and restrict the President's use of the military in securing foreign policy objectives. The Resolution compels the President to consult Congress, in every possible instance, before introducing U.S. troops into a foreign trouble spot. In addition, Congress is to receive, in the absence of a declaration of war, a Presidential report within 48 hours and on the 60th and 90th day. After 90 days, the troops are to be withdrawn unless otherwise ordered by Congress. Pat M. Holt, The War Powers Resolution (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 3.

[5]Allison, Essence of Decision. p. 118.

[6]Ibid., p. 266.

[7]Ibid., p. 67. Allison characterizes intra-governmental organizations as a conglomeration of semi-feudal, loosely allied entities each with substantial life of its own. Ibid., p. 67.

[8]Ibid., p. 123. The Air Force conducted the mission but the ten day delay constituted a failure. "In the face of well-founded suspicions about the offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba that posed a critical threat to the most vital U.S. interests, squabbling between organizations whose job it is to produce this information seems entirely inappropriate." Ibid., p. 123.

[9]Lowenthal, "U.S. Policy Towards Latin America." p. 114.

[10]Ibid., p. 144. According to Lowenthal, each individual player is in a centralized competitive game confined to regularized circuits. Ibid., p. 144.

[11]Graham T. Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Theory and Policy in International Relations, ed. Raymond Tanter and Richard Ullman (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 44-48.

[12]Lowenthal, "U.S. Policy Towards Latin America." p. 115. Although specialists and scholars were important they do not distract from the President's ability to establish the direction in which the bureaucracy proceeds. John W. Spaner and Eric M. Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy is Made (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 21-22.

[13]Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Miffin Company, 1965), p. 189. Dillon was also regarded as "the most knowledgeable high-level U.S. government official on the economic problems of the hemisphere." Levinson and DeOnis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way, p. 65.

[14]Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 199. Adolf Berle, New York lawyer and professor of International Law at Columbia University, "pulled together the main strands of American liberalism as they applied to Latin America." Levinson and DeOnis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way, p. 54. In addition to Berle, there was Richard Goodwin and his associate Karl Mayer, Latin American editorialist for the Washington Post. Goodwin, a Harvard Law School graduate, was "Kennedy's man on Latin America." Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 192.

[15]Ibid., p. 176. Also see Symour E. Harris, The Economies of the Political Parties (New York: MacMillan Company, 1962), p. 25.

[16]Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 187.

[17]Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Travels, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw Hill Company, 1968), p. 295. Confirming this view is Robert Wagner who contends that "when foreign policy decision are related to national security the President can seek to assert the obvious collective interest over individual or group interest." Robert H. Wagner, United States Policy Toward Latin America: A Study in Domestic and International Politics (California: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 107.

[18]Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Travels, p. 297. According to Hoffman, the crisis atmosphere can also lead to a process known as consensus-building and a phenomenon known as "group think"--the process by which the President rallies support in a crisis causes achievement of a consensus among Presidential advisors to become more important than exploring all the alternatives to the problem itself. Ibid., p. 300. For more on the topic of "group think" see Irving L Janis, Victims of Group Think (Boston: Houghton Miffin Company, 1967).

[19]Christopher Mitchell, "Dominance and Fragmentation in U.S. Latin American Policy," in Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities, ed. Julio Cotler and Richard R Fagen (California: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 188.

[20]Wagner, United States Policy Towards Latin America, p. 82.

[21]John Spanier and Eric Uslaner conclude that unlike crisis decisions, Program Policy Decisions (long-term foreign Policy) necessitates the continual input from agencies, interest groups, businesses, and Congress. Long-term policy, therefore, results from a process of bargaining and compromise. Spaner and Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy is Made, p. 21.

[22]According to Levinson and DeOnis, "the business community viewed their brevity as a rebuff by the Kennedy administration and their vagueness as a refusal to provide security against expropriations." Levinson and DeOnis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way, p. 12.

[23]The Alliance Charter is misleadingly vague about the role of private investment. However, once the assistance programs were underway, policymakers concluded that private businesses' role would be crucial. A 1964 joint Congressional committee report strongly urged that U.S. foreign policies give greater weight to encourage private investment and enterprise in Latin America. David E. Bell,

administrator of the Agency for International Development, argued for increased private investment in Latin America while proposing that its involvement thus far "contributed to the amelioration of some of the region's most basic economic problems." U.S., Congress, Private Investment in Latin America, pp. 456-457.

[24]Levinson and DeOnis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way, p. 144.

[25]Ibid., p. 151.

[26]Ibid., p. 151.

[27]Christopher Mitchell, "Dominance and Fragmentation in U.S. Latin American Policy," p. 189.

[28]Levinson and DeOnis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way, p. 114.

[29]Ibid., p. 117.

[30]Ibid., p. 113.

[31]Riordan Roett, The Politics of Aid in Northeast Brazil (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), p. 116.

[32]Ibid., p.117

[33]Ibid., p. x.

[34]Ibid., p. 126.

[35]Ibid., p. x.

CONCLUSION

Based on an assessment of its accuracy and validity and the success of its application during the Alliance for Progress, this thesis asks whether the theory of underdevelopment and violence represents a viable foundation for United States foreign policy. The methods employed to answer this question were utilized in three chapters. Chapter one uncovered the concepts of the theory of underdevelopment and violence. Chapter two established the validity and accuracy of the theory and chapter three assessed, with the aid of three different perspectives, the success of its application during the Alliance for Progress. As a result of this examination, a judgment can now be made regarding the theory's viability as a basis for United States foreign policy in underdeveloped nations.

In chapter one, four assumptions that form the theory of underdevelopment and violence were uncovered by examining the official documents and statements from the period of the Alliance for Progress and the findings and recommendations of the 1984 National Bipartisan Commission Report on Central America. The first assumption indicates that economic,

political, and social underdevelopment lead to violence and instability. It was believed that frustration over these conditions caused people to react violently. The second assumption illustrates that violence and instability cause the root conditions, economic, political, and social underdevelopment, to worsen. This interrelationship can be characterized as a cyclical process whereby underdevelopment leads to violence and instability which in turn foster increased underdevelopment. The third assumption theorizes that the degenerating cycle of underdevelopment, violence, and instability encourage communist subversion and revolution. Finally, the fourth assumption argues that violence, instability, and communist encroachment can be stopped by bringing about economic, political, and social development.

In chapter two, the analysis of the theoretical foundations of the theory of underdevelopment and violence focused on three questions. First, can it be stated with certainty that economic, political, and social underdevelopment cause violence, instability, and communist encroachment? Second, are all three conditions of underdevelopment equally important or does economic underdevelopment alone spark violence and instability? And third, do the relationships proposed by the theory of underdevelopment and violence provide a foundation for defined policies with specific objectives? The conclusions

illustrated that the relationships proposed by the theory of underdevelopment and violence are uncertain, and thus do not provide a sufficient foundation for policy. Without knowing the type and magnitude of underdevelopment that will cause violence, policymakers cannot establish a cause and effect relationship that will allow them to develop plans of action with definite goals. The theory of underdevelopment and violence appears to leave policymakers with little knowledge except for the very general idea that various kinds of underdevelopment seem to be related in some way to the occurrence of violence.

In the third chapter, three perspectives, the liberal, radical, and bureaucratic, were used to appraise the success of the theory of underdevelopment and violence as it was applied during the Alliance for Progress.

According to the liberal perspective, the Alliance failed because of the incorrect assumption that the middle class of Latin America would be willing and able to carry out development programs.

The theory of underdevelopment and violence was conceived and implemented exclusively from the perspective of U.S. middle class values and desires--not Latin American. The cause of the Alliance's problems can be attributed to the attempt to apply U.S. middle class values to the different middle class values in Latin America. As a result, the obstacles encountered in applying the theory of

underdevelopment and violence during the Alliance for Progress resulted not as much from the theory's assumptions, but that the remedy for overcoming violence through the extension of development assistance, which reflected U.S. middle class values, would not apply in countries that had completely different middle class values.

Unlike the liberal account of the Alliance for Progress, the radical perspective rests upon the supposition that the very nature of U.S. involvement in Latin America is exploitive. According to radicals, the Alliance for Progress was never intended to benefit Latin America. Its purpose was to subsidize U.S. foreign investors. Its aim also included protecting U.S. overseas businesses by withholding or releasing Alliance funds to Latin American governments.

However, if we overlook the radical assumption that U.S. policy is driven by exploitation and protection of U.S. businesses, insight can be gained as to the success of the Alliance for Progress.

Considering that U.S. business interests are not necessarily paramount to U.S. foreign policy, but do represent an important force, the value of the radical view emerges in its recognition that these interests did not coincide with the theory of economic, political and social development in Latin America. Business interests were clearly important considerations during the Alliance for

Progress and did affect policy. What the radical perspective provides is the recognition that U.S. foreign policy is affected by business interests and that these interests are not necessarily devoted to economic, political, and social development in Latin America.

Finally, the bureaucratic perspective presented a critique of the Alliance for Progress based on knowledge of the roles and interests of the groups and individuals who create, influence, and implement foreign policy. Writers who represent the bureaucratic perspective maintain that the Alliance for Progress was conceived in a non-traditional setting were the normal foreign policy participants were excluded. Based on the crisis tone of the administration's appraisal of Latin America and the president's desire to restrict policy formation to a small inner circle of advisors, those organizations and individuals responsible for implementing the Alliance were omitted from its creation, but however, were able to gain considerable influence over its direction once the programs were put into action.

Two groups that gained considerable leverage over the direction of Alliance policy were U.S. businesses and the Agency for International Development (AID). The successful reintroduction of business interests can be traced to the passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment. The resurgence of AID's influence can be tracked to the political battle over

the desire to counter communist influence with short-term highly visible programs rather than the more long-term development plans originally envisioned by the Alliance's founders.

In conclusion, the theory of underdevelopment and violence, in its present form, does not represent a viable foundation for United States foreign policy in under-developed countries of the world. The theory consists of an unproven set of assumptions that do not establish a solid foundation for foreign policy. In addition, the application of the theory during the Alliance demonstrated numerous problems. First, the theory is based on U.S. middle class values and desires. Its success is dependent upon the acceptance of these values in societies were middle class values are not the same. Unless the theory can be modified to reflect the values of the society to which it will be applied, it will likely encounter the same problems. Second, business interests affect foreign policy and they do not necessarily coincide with economic, political, and social development policies. And third, during the Alliance, the theory of underdevelopment and violence was conceived and implemented without the participation of many traditional foreign policy actors. Once those traditional players were called upon to implement the Alliance, they were able to transform the program to suit their interests and concerns. Due to the nature of the U.S. foreign policy

process, it is likely that the theory of underdevelopment and violence would be subjected to the same pressures if it were to be set in motion again.

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VITA

WILLIAM PLATON MANDROS

Born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, July 9, 1960. Graduated from Groveton High School, June 1978, B.A., Radford University, 1983. Entered the College of William & Mary as an M.A. candidate in September, 1983.